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WORD COUNT
669
OCTOBER 15, 2008
EUROPEAN
MISSILE DEFENSE IS A LOSER – by Katie Mounts and Travis Sharp
The Bush
administration has tried for years to build support for a long-range
missile defense system in Europe. White House officials claim that the
system will protect America’s allies from an Iranian missile attack.
Unfortunately, the proposed system is plagued with budgetary, technical,
and political problems, and actually poses serious risks to American
security. Construction of a rushed, haphazard missile defense system in
Europe is not in the short- or long-term interests of the United States.
The
responsible Pentagon organization, the Missile Defense Agency, estimates
the European system will cost $4 billion over the next five years. There
is reason to suspect that this estimate is grossly underestimated,
however, due to the agency’s method of building weapons.
This
method is known as “spiral development,” a process where development and
production unfold simultaneously. It is equivalent to
Ford or Chevrolet assembling a new car and letting people drive it
around town without first completing engineering blueprints or testing
the design. This haphazard approach inevitably results in multiple
changes during production. Each time the Pentagon goes back to the
drawing board, it costs American taxpayers millions of dollars.
But if the only problem with European missile defense were that it is
experimental and expensive, perhaps it could still be acceptable. After
all, no price is too high to pay in order to protect American lives and
those of our allies. The Missile Defense Agency, however, has a very
risky secret: The system is based on shaky technical assumptions and is
not yet ready for real-life combat scenarios.
The system
proposed for deployment in Europe, a two-stage interceptor, has never
been tested. The Bush administration claims that since it is based on a
three-stage design that previously has been tested (albeit in
unrealistic conditions), there is nothing to worry about. Two stages are
clearly less than three, so the European design has to work, right?
Not so fast. A 2007 report by the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, the office that verifies the readiness of defense programs,
concluded that the effectiveness of the two-stage interceptor “cannot be
assumed,” and that at least three flight tests are necessary before the
system is deployed.
Moreover, the system currently is unable to overcome
decoys
designed to distract radar systems such as balloons, debris, or other
radar-absorbing materials. A 1999 National Intelligence Estimate
determined that any country sophisticated enough to develop a ballistic
missile would have the technical means to produce these decoys. In other
words, the European missile defense system is unable to do what it was
designed to do. This explains why Philip Coyle, former director of the
Defense Test and Evaluation Agency, calls the system “a scarecrow
defense.”
There
are also
political consequences to building missile
defense in Europe. Russia is opposed to the system, believing it is
really aimed at Moscow and surrounds Russia with new American weapons
and bases. While experts debate whether the system would threaten
Russia’s nuclear arsenal, the threat of aggressive Russian action in its
near vicinity is very real.
Former
Russian President Vladimir Putin and current President Dmitri Medvedev
have already threatened to respond to the placement of missile defense
interceptors in Poland. If Russia’s recent actions in Georgia are any
indication, these are not empty threats.
Ignoring
Russian objections also may lead to an arms race, elements of which are
already developing. Russia has now withdrawn or threatened to withdraw
from two key treaties – the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty – that have placed a ceiling on
nuclear weapons stockpiles since the Cold War.
In
December 2009, the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty is set to expire.
Unless a continuation or replacement to this treaty is negotiated soon,
the United States could lose the ability to oversee and verify Russian
disarmament activities.
Now is not
the time for Russia and the United States to stop working together on
issues like Iran, terrorism, nuclear nonproliferation, and energy. There
is simply too much at stake in the months and years ahead.
--
Katie
Mounts and Travis Sharp are analysts at the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation in Washington, D.C.
http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/ -- email
tsharp@armscontrolcenter.org
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